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Chapter Twenty-One
Taking Off the Safety Catch: 
Communication and Culture in the 
Anglosphere and Continental Europe
Will Barton and Andrew Beck
Introduction
or some time now we have been investigating a number of 
related areas of communication, including the use of war as 
mass communication and entertainment, the replacement of 
politics by spectacle, and the increasing salience of 
conspiracy theories.
At the same time we have been unwilling conscripts in the universal 
research project that is the bureaucratisation and managerialisation of Higher 
Education, with its rhetorics of goal orientation, strategy, and aims and 
objectives. These disparate strands of scholarship have led us to propose a 
vigorous and aggressive postmodernism, grounded in Jencks more than in 
Jameson. This is that impossible chimera: a postmodernism taken seriously.
Such a position is not a vain and inane attempt to ‘go beyond’ 
postmodernism, in the manner of that most old fashioned notion, the avant-
garde, but rather an attempt to deal sensibly with the inescapable critiques of 
modernism that the last half of the twentieth century threw up.
For the purposes of the current paper, these can be classified under these 
headings:
 the futility of strategy
 the downgrading of science
 the resurrection of religion
 coming to terms with the Death of Man
 opposition to culture and especially cultural studies.
Our position is informed by a reading of the sociology of science of Bruno 
Latour and the philosophy of science of Paul Feyerabend, of Foucault’s 
arguments against the human (particularly as glossed by Levy), of Negri and 
Hart’s postmarxist (sic) analysis of global capitalism and of Peter Sloterdyjk’s 
Critique of Cynical Reason.
Mass Media: International Issues
296
However the work that most centrally encapsulates our overall approach is 
the fiction of Michel Houellebecque, particularly the novel Atomised. This is 
founded on the notion that a change in the way we understand our world has 
occurred, with far reaching and irrevocable consequences for our metaphysic, 
or weltanschaung, and our epistemology.
For us, this is that the basic substance of our world is not that of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During that period, the high water mark of 
modernity, the world consisted primarily of matter: the brute, solid physicality 
of the real. This is no longer the case. Our world is primarily constituted not of 
matter but of information.  Information does not obey the same scientific laws 
as matter. It is not subject to such constraints as the laws of thermodynamics, 
gravity or relativity. Information can, for example, be created or destroyed.
The consequences of this are wide ranging. A non-material world, freed 
from the constraints of the laws of physics, is investigated not by the 
disciplines of hard science or even of social science but by the informational 
and human sciences - informatics, art history, literary criticism, and 
Communication Studies.
This brings us to the central contention of this paper, which is that the 
Cultural Studies project is inescapably trapped in an outdated materialism and 
so is irrelevant to the investigation of the world in which we now live.  It has, 
after all, always characterised itself as the study of material culture.
It is perhaps because of this that Cultural Studies has been driven into a 
psychological position of denial. Specifically, it has spectacularly sought to 
rewrite its own history.
The Futility of Strategy
Strategy has a number of related definitions. It derives from the   
Greek stratēgia, referring to military leadership and generalship. It signifies 
variously a method or techne for achieving long term goals, planning, military 
and business operations, the science or art of planning and conducting a war or 
a military campaign, or the biological adaptation important to evolutionary 
success.
In everyday life and in our immediate environment, we can observe the 
ubiquity of strategies for sales and marketing, social control (health, smoking, 
drinking), teaching and learning, and research. Yet we also have to 
acknowledge that these are rarely achieved or implemented. Usually they serve 
for a while as devotional or exemplary rhetorical devices and are then forgotten 
and replaced with a new and different strategy.  (Often because they don’t 
conform to the proofs of the science that their rhetorics aspire to.)
It is our central contention that, in the postmodern condition, long term 
planning is futile. This is because it is based on modernist and scientistic 
presumptions, namely that the world is constant and knowable and therefore 
that it is predictable.  Such assumptions, grounded in the paradigms of natural 
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science and social science, seem to apply to a more innocent, perhaps even 
prelapsarian, world.  These days we regard them with a more cynical eye.
Perhaps the greatest example of the futility of planning is the sudden 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. When the Berlin Wall came 
down in 1989, it was an unforeseen event – potentially more embarrassing and 
destabilising to US than USSR policies and ambitions. A system and regime 
that was the object of intense scrutiny and study, that was watched more 
closely and critically than any in history, that was infiltrated and spied upon, 
and was modelled and monitored, behaved in an utterly unforeseen way. No 
more dramatic illustration could be imagined to demonstrate that the laws of 
history are entirely unlike those of natural science.
It is our contention that a profound change in human metaphysics underlies 
this, the sort of change discussed in Michel Houellebecq’s novel, Atomised:
Metaphysical mutations – that is to say radical, global transformations 
in the values to which the majority subscribe – are rare in the history of 
humanity.  The rise of Christianity might be cited as an example.
Once a metaphysical mutation has arisen, it tends to move inexorably 
towards its logical conclusion.  Heedlessly, it sweeps away economic 
and political systems, ethical considerations and social structures.  No 
human agency can halt its progress – nothing, but another metaphysical 
mutation.
It is a fallacy that such metaphysical mutations gain ground only in 
weakened societies or those in decline.  When Christianity appeared, the 
Roman Empire was at the height of its powers: supremely organised, it 
dominated the known world.  Its technical and military prowess had no 
rival; nonetheless, it had no chance.  When modern science appeared, 
medieval Christianity was a complete, comprehensive system which 
explained man and the universe; it was the basis for the government of 
peoples, the inspiration for knowledge and art, the arbiter of war as of 
peace and the power behind the production and distribution of wealth; 
none of these was sufficient to prevent its downfall.
  (Houellebecq 2001: 4) 
If the notion of a postmodern condition (Lyotard 1984) is taken seriously 
we have to realise that most of what has so far passed for postmodernism has, 
in fact been closet modernism. Most soi-dissant postmodernists have, in fact, 
clung to the tenets of materialism, monism, scientific thought and even 
Marxism. Yet postmodernism is a heresy of modernism and not a branch of it.  
If it means anything at all, it has to challenge and undermine these notions.  
Unless and until it does so it is the merest frivolity, but when it does, it 
becomes radically and profoundly dangerous. It dizzyingly dissolves all 
certainties and the ground beneath our feet vanishes:
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Postmodernism is a symptom, not a fresh solution.  It lives under the 
modern Constitution, but it no longer believes in the guarantees the 
Constitution offers.  It senses that something has gone awry in the 
modern critique, but it is not able to do anything but prolong that 
critique, though without believing in its foundations (Lyotard 1979).  
Instead of moving on to empirical studies of the networks that give 
meaning to the work of purification it denounces, postmodernism rejects 
all empirical work as illusory and deceptively scientistic (Baudrillard, 
1992).  Disappointed rationalists, its adepts indeed sense that 
modernism is done for, but they continue to accept its way of dividing up 
time; thus they can divide up eras only in terms of successive 
revolutions.  They feel that they come ‘after’ the moderns, but with the 
disagreeable sentiment that there is no more ‘after’.  ‘No future’: this is 
the slogan added to the moderns’ motto ‘No past’.  What remains?
     (Latour 1993: 46)
The Downgrading of Science
This radical postmodernism implies that science will have to be put in its 
place. And where is science’s place? What is it good for? It’s good at 
controlling and explaining the material world, not at describing or prescribing 
human actions. The lumpen and lumbering attempts by the new pseudoscience 
of Evolutionary Psychology to reduce us to genetically programmed 
reproductive machines ultimately comes down to that most hackneyed of right-
wing slogans “You can’t change human nature”. Ever since Feyerabend 
published Against Method (1978), the science wars have raged. Outraged 
materialists like Dawkins are aghast and uncomprehending as the sea of faith 
that ebbed from Dover Beach has turned its tide and irrationalism, religion, and 
magical thinking return to the mainstream of human discursive traffic.
The core of our critique is that the world can no longer be understood
primarily as a material object but only as an informational one.  Information 
operates under different constraints from physical matter and obeys different 
laws. Areas of human activity and experience that are highly problematised 
within a crudely materialist or physicalist metaphysic seem to be readmissible 
to academic investigation within an informational paradigm:
The Post-Modern Age is a time of incessant choosing.  It’s an era when 
no orthodoxy can be adopted without self-consciousness and irony, 
because all traditions seem to have some validity. This is partly a 
consequence of what is called the information explosion, the advent of 
organised knowledge, world communication and cybernetics. It is not 
only the rich who become collectors, eclectic travellers in time with a 
superabundance of choice, but almost every urban dweller. Pluralism, 
the ‘ism’ of our time, is both the great problem and the great 
opportunity: where Everyman becomes a Cosmopolite and Everywoman 
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a Liberated Individual, confusion and anxiety become ruling states of 
mind and ersatz a common form of mass-culture. This is the price we 
pay for a Post-Modern Age, as heavy in its way as the monotony, 
dogmatism and poverty of the Modern epoch. But, in spite of many 
attempts in Iran and elsewhere, it is impossible to return to a previous 
culture and industrial form, impose a fundamentalist religion or even a 
Modernist orthodoxy. Once a world communication system and form of 
cybernetic production have emerged they create their own necessities 
and they are, barring a nuclear war, irreversible.
(Jencks 1986: 7)
The Resurrection of Religion
The most obvious of these is religion. We contend it is no accident that as 
the information economies have begun to displace the rustbelt industries and as 
economic and cultural life has become increasingly sited within virtual and 
electronic/informational spaces, the significance in public discourse of spiritual 
figures, organisations, and paradigms has blossomed.
Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the significance of Islam in 
contemporary politics and moral discourse, but we would also cite such 
manifestations as the New Age movement, the unprecedented international 
media interest in the Papacy (exemplified by coverage of the recent death of 
John-Paul II and election of a new Holy Father) and even religiously themed 
conspiracy theory texts like The Da Vinci Code.
This is not to say that all recent manifestations of religious or spiritual 
discourse should be considered postmodernist. We would, for example, 
specifically exclude those phenomena generally described as ‘fundamentalist’, 
whether in Islam or in Christianity. Literalism in the interpretation of holy texts 
is really the misapplication of them to the explanation of the material world.  In 
other words it’s not, properly considered, religion - just bad science.
Coming to Terms with the Death of Man
Consider Bernard Henri Levy:
I won’t discuss here what Foucault really meant when he claimed that 
‘man’ was not ‘the oldest problem’ or even ‘the most persistent’ in the 
history of mankind.  But I do remember his critique of the concept of 
‘power’, his notion of ‘knowledge-as-power’, and the fresh attention he 
paid to what he called ‘the infinitely small elements of political power’.  
I also remember the way he elaborated the concept of the ‘physical 
nature of power’ from book to book.  I remember the picture he drew of 
the social body as a scattered constellation of forces which confronted 
each other and of monads which balanced each other.  Today, I am 
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aware there was no better or newer method of confounding and then 
eliminating the old Marxist notion of power viewed as a gigantic macro-
structure with its intricacies and procedures.  It isn’t a question of 
determining whether Foucault’s system stands up or whether his 
objection to Marxist politics was the ‘right’ one.  As you will recall, 
Foucault urged those who read his books to use them as if they were 
boxes of tools.  That’s what we did and our reason for doing so was that 
they were the appropriate tools for dismantling a system we no longer 
needed.  If you compare Aron’s methodology with that of Foucault, you 
realise how old and worn out it is, having conveyed an overwhelming 
sense of rightness for several decades.  You’ll become aware that it 
doesn’t work and never did.  Surveiller et punir offered an alternative 
philosophy with which to demolish other systems.
  (Levy 1995: 345-6)
Or, consider another passage from Houellebecq’s Atomised:
“I’d like to believe that the self is an illusion,” said Bruno quietly, “but 
if it is, it’s a pretty painful one”.  Michel, who knew nothing about 
Buddhism, couldn’t answer.
(Houellebecq 2001: 76-77)
Opposition to Culture and to Cultural Studies
A key feature of culturalist notions of postmodernism is that it is perfectly 
legitimate to play fast and loose with history (Stevens’ Supreme Fiction).  
Another key feature has been its effecting its entry into wider acceptance and 
credibility by entering Communication Studies in the body of an intellectual 
Trojan Horse. This has resulted in the reproduction of Communication Studies’ 
history where its theoretical underpinnings are not always chronologically 
presented. We argue this more thoroughly elsewhere (Barton and Beck 2005) 
but what we can do here is to offer a flavour of this ahistorical argumentation.
Key to the construction of Cultural Studies as a discipline has been the way 
that it has concerned itself, almost obsessively, with its status and its history, 
and how it has worried, equally obsessively, over the moments of the Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham University.  Like a petulant 
child wanting to eat its cake and have it Cultural Studies has argued that it has 
no methodology and no set of key beliefs, that it is at once outside 
disciplinarity and yet constitutes a discipline in its own right. Over twenty 
years ago Stuart Hall remarked that ‘there is as yet no detailed or accredited 
history of the Centre’s inauguration and development’ (Hall 1984a: 277). And 
whilst it is still the case that the history of the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies’ history is still the subject of dispute it is remarkable how a 
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relatively stable version of the Centre’s achievements, impact, and influence 
has been produced and circulated.
It is a commonplace for Cultural Studies to argue that, in terms of the 
history of the study of communication, it offered significant rebuttals to 
established orthodoxies. This is key to Stuart Halls’ ‘Introduction to media 
studies at the Centre’ (Hall 1984b). As summarised by Norma Schulman, Hall 
claimed that Cultural Studies broke with what was characterised as the 
‘behaviouristic emphases of previous research responses’ which had viewed 
the media influencing people in a ‘direct, stimulus-response’ fashion 
(Schulman 1993: 55). Whatever credibility the Stimulus-Organism-Response 
model (the hypodermic model) had within Communication Studies the claim 
that Cultural Studies overturned the soft assumptions of the hypodermic 
approach is undermined by the fact that Melvin DeFleur had significantly 
critiqued that position some 24 years before Hall asserted Cultural Studies had 
made the very same achievement. First published in 1960 DeFleur’s 
Psychodynamic Model suggested that, at the very least, the stimulus would 
have to be very powerful, the organism would have to be susceptible, and the 
degree of response would be slight and not fundamental. Cultural Studies 
ignores or erases Communication Studies’ capacity for auto-critique to make 
the greater case for its achievements.  
Time is similarly bent out of shape with the coming to the UK of semiotics 
and structuralism.  Although the theorisations that informed the second wave of 
Communication thought were formulated before the publication of those 
process models which informed the second wave of Communication thought, 
their impact on thinking about Communication appeared to be critical rather 
than fundamental.  Semiotic ideas were first devised over fifty years before the 
first process models but they weren’t known or discussed outside the world of 
academic linguistics. Ferdinand de Saussure’s ideas about general linguistics, 
first aired in his lectures at the end of the nineteenth century, did not achieve 
significant recognition until the late 1950s – and then only in France and then 
only through the work of Roland Barthes. And it took until the 1970s for those 
ideas to make the journey into the world of Anglophone theory in the form of a 
heady mixture of de Saussure’s general linguistics, Marx and Engels’ historical 
materialism, and Freud’s psychoanalysis.
In his 1988 novel Nice Work David Lodge neatly summarised the impact of 
the arrival of this heady mixture of perspectives and analytical methods on UK 
higher education. He lists those perspectives and methods and atomises their 
disruptive impact: ‘structuralism and poststructuralism, semiotics and 
deconstruction, new mutations and graftings of psychoanalysis and Marxism, 
linguistics and literary criticism. The more conservative dons viewed these 
ideas and their proponents with alarm, seeing in them a threat to the traditional 
values and methods of literary scholarship’ (Lodge 1988: 46). But Lodge 
seems to have taken at face value the histories that his colleagues in 
Birmingham University presented him with in their various histories of the 
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Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and presented the whole Left Bank 
package as a late-coming challenge to process orthodoxy.
In this vein an easy and self-serving narrative is endlessly reproduced: in 
the UK (at the very least) Communication Studies’ move from being studied 
from a process perspective to being studied from a semiotic perspective 
marked a significant shift. The narrative continues: the 1980s and the 1990s 
were an historical era characterised by a loss of belief in science (or, at the very 
least, hard science) and by loss of consensus (who is the ‘we’ in so much of 
contemporary rhetoric?). Ultimately, Cultural Studies sought to supplant 
Communication Studies, arguing that the hard science had to be turned away 
from and the search for consensus abandoned. The stronger discipline was 
stronger because it regarded itself as more hesitant, partial, and tentative. (To 
try to be consensual now would be to commit oneself to being out of step with 
the spirit of the times.) In seeking to propose a post-Marxism (what Hall once 
characterised as a ‘complex Marxism’ (Hall 1984a: 25) we can only find a pre-
Marxism (in the same way that Sartre once argued that to be anti-Marxist was 
to be pre-Marxist). And in seeking to embrace an unscientific, pre-Marxist 
fluidity the history of Communication Studies is traduced.
Conclusion
The implication of Foucault’s famous denunciation of the concept of the 
Human as a transcendent concept, free of history and unconstructed, is that as 
we move deeper into the postmodern condition we expect the Human to shift 
from the material to the informational world. The notion of individual identity 
is persistent and difficult to submit to critique but it needs to be done. Much of 
what has so far passed for postmodern scholarship has been in the area of 
material culture; indeed this is central to the discipline of Cultural Studies.  In a 
postmaterialist, informationalist world, the discipline that studies the Human 
will be Communication Studies.
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